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Improving the Regulatory Analysis of the 
Cooling Water Intake Structure Rule:
What Does an Economist Want?
Scott Farrow
I. Introduction
Proponents, opponents, and some who aren’t too sure have spilled much ink on the merits of 
cost–benefit analysis in support of government decisions, including the development of 
regulations. In this paper, I present a proponent’s view in the specific context of establishing 
requirements for cooling water intake structures (CWIS) at existing power plants (EPA 2004a).
The policy context, regulatory proposal, and environmental and economic evaluation of this 
regulation are summarized by Harrington (this volume). Voluminous comments were filed on 
particular aspects of the estimation procedures, and one more commenter on such details is 
unlikely to add much value. In its response to public comments, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) used 5,143 pages; of those, about 1,200 focused on benefits related to 
economics (EPA 2004e). Consequently, the focus of this chapter is on the consistency of the 
CWIS cost–benefit analysis with quality criteria to which the agency might have been expected 
to adhere and significantly less on specific details of the existing analysis.
In the remainder of the chapter, I focus on four topics. First, I discuss criteria for evaluating the 
economic content of the rule and whether the rule met those criteria. Second, I investigate 
criteria and outcomes with respect to decision rules for the design of the regulation. Third, I 
address the challenge faced by agency analysts because of the frontier nature of research linking
ecological and economic impacts. Finally, I provide suggestions for improvement.  3
II. Criteria and Evaluation for the Economic Review of the CWIS Rule 
What are the most appropriate economically based criteria for review of the regulatory impact 
analysis (RIA) conducted by EPA and how did the analysis perform on those criteria? Two sets 
of criteria appear relevant. The first set refers to analytical standards for the content of the 
analysis. The second set refers to decisionmaking standards that are at the boundary of economic 
and other risk management approaches. Although important nuances can be found in the text, I 
conclude that the RIA met minimum necessary analytical economic standards and may have met 
additional professional analytical standards. The analysis further met some aspects of economic-
based decisionmaking standards but failed a critical one based on the law. I discuss each
conclusion in turn.
A. What an Economist Wants I: Analytical Standards for the Content of the Analysis  
In contrast to accounting, in which Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are 
issued by professional organizations, no standards from a professional society are available for
cost–benefit analysis (GAO 2005; Bray et al. 2007). Instead, reviewers generally refer to two 
sources—guidance provided by government agencies and the published literature.  These sources 
are equivalent to the two lowest-ranking sources in a hierarchy of standards for accountants and 
auditors (GAO 2005).  For EPA regulations, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
EPA have developed guidance (OMB 1992, 2003; EPA 2000) based primarily on authority 
derived from executive orders related to cost–benefit analysis and regulatory development. 
Based on the OMB guidance, Hahn and Dudley (2007), Belzer (1999), and GAO (2005) have 4
developed scorecards for the basic quality of an analysis.  These scorecards provide a way to 
determine whether the analysis was consistent with elements of OMB guidance and essentially 
are a type of analytical process check.  An analysis substantially lacking these elements would 
almost certainly be a poor-quality cost–benefit analysis. For instance, questions on the scorecard 
refer to whether benefits are stated, quantified, or monetized; whether discounting was used and 
at what rate; whether alternatives were evaluated; and whether uncertainty was incorporated. 
However, while consistency with the guidance may be viewed as a necessary condition for a 
good-quality analysis, it is not sufficient. In particular, the analysis may have been done 
incompletely or incorrectly, in which case the result would be of poor quality.   
I provide a slightly modified version of the scorecard used by Hahn and Dudley (2007) in Table 
1. In this modification, I have deleted items specifically related to health, safety, or an executive 
summary as these were immaterial for the case at hand. The right-hand column provides my
subjective assessment of the CWIS rule. Note, however, that some items are difficult to answer 
with a “yes” or “no” and the record was quite extensive. For instance, a reviewer might wish to 
know whether all or nearly all of the material beneficial impacts of the regulation had been 
considered, but this is difficult to ascertain without additional information and judgments. In the 
CWIS case, some commenters believed and I concur that nonuse and some types of fishery stock 
effects were potentially large and should have been included; consequently a “no” is recorded for 
“monetized all or nearly all benefits” in contrast to “monetized some benefits”.  However, this is 
a matter of judgment on items where information is lacking.
Insert Table 1 about here.5
At this analytical process level, the EPA CWIS RIA passes virtually all of the steps of the 
scorecard, in contrast to many regulations (Hahn and Dudley 2007). The RIA
1 monetized at least 
some costs and benefits, estimated monetized net benefits, considered alternatives, used a 
prescribed discount rate, and so on. The RIA earns poorer marks on the clarity of analysis to 
justify trade-offs made in the regulation and the completeness of the benefits estimation. For 
instance, the RIA provides no logical or conceptual model up front to convey the sequence of 
steps, and important components are spread across multiple documents including the Economic 
and Benefit Analysis (EPA 2004b), Regional Analysis (EPA 2004c) and the Technical 
Development Document (EPA 2004d). Some of the analyses are quite involved, such as the 
econometrically estimated Random Utility Model, and others are simpler. Although summary 
tables of benefit and cost results are provided in both the final Federal Register notice and in the 
Economic and Benefits Analysis (EPA 2004b), these tables provide minimal caution about the 
analytical steps and the degree of precision. The latter issue also relates to the treatment of 
uncertainty in the final Federal Register notice itself, which does not convey some of the 
extended uncertainty analyses carried out in various supporting documents. Similarly, although 
implicit throughout the analyses, EPA provides no direct reporting of an average cost per adverse 
environmental impact (AEI) for different alternatives. The alternatives analysis, with its implicit 
wet cooling tower benchmark technology, was not clearly brought into the analysis as a likely 
“default” technology against which other regulations were measured. This is an example of an 
instance in which the usual “do nothing” alternative of cost–benefit analysis would not seem to 
be appropriate given the clear direction to “do something.” Consequently, although many of the 
                                                
1 The RIA is here taken to be the final notice in the Federal Register and the final version of supporting documents. 
Where important, distinctions among documents are noted in the text.6
necessary aspects identified in the guidance were done well, other aspects—such as those
identified in Table 1—were touched upon but could have been improved.
What of the role of a review standard based on the professional literature that goes beyond the 
necessary aspects identified in guidance and scorecard approaches? This criterion is more 
nebulous because of the ambiguity and vastness of the professional literature as applied to a 
specific problem. Variations may also exist for standard practice, best practice, and frontier 
application. However, this concern for the quality of the analysis is related to other guidance 
from OMB (2002) based on the Data Quality Act. In this guidance document, quality is 
composed of utility, objectivity, and integrity. Procedural steps are identified through which 
agencies can achieve quality; these procedures include the use of peer review panels, whereby
the review is conducted by people with a professionally equivalent or advanced understanding of 
the problem investigated by the agency. However, if an analysis appears in a peer-reviewed 
publication, then it may—but need not—have met the data quality standards. In the case of a 
peer review panel, peer reviewers are not blind to the identity of the author and are selected by 
the reviewing authority, whereas in the case of a peer-reviewed publication, the reviewers are
generally “blind”, and are selected by the editors of the publishing outlet. To some extent, the 
availability of a document for public comment can be viewed as a nonblind review process in 
which the selection of the reviewers is based on self-interest, which can include payment from 
any parties. OMB review of RIAs might be viewed by some as another type of peer review and,
in fact, OMB appears to hold that opinion.
2 Three tests might be identified based on these 
                                                
2 OMB guidance appears to exempt regulatory analyses from peer review, saying  “[t]his Bulletin covers original 
data and formal analytical models used by agencies in Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs). However, the RIA 
documents themselves are already reviewed through an interagency review process under E.O. 12866…. In that 
respect, RIAs are excluded from coverage by this Bulletin...” OMB (2005, 2674).7
different processes. First, did the agency conduct a peer review of the analysis and, if so, what 
was the outcome? Second, how did professional commenters respond during the public comment 
period? And third, is the analysis based on a peer-reviewed publication or, somewhat weaker, is 
it likely that a peer-reviewed publication would publish a paper based on the analysis? I briefly 
address these three checks on quality in turn.
Did EPA assemble a peer review panel of the cost–benefit analysis and, if so, what were the 
results? Partially. A peer review panel was convened for the ecological and fisheries aspects of 
impingement and entrainment, and a separate panel was convened on nonuse values, although 
the latter panel addressed a later phase of the regulation. As is often the case, the review panels 
developed a variety of comments and suggestions for improvement (EPA 2002; RTI
International 2005). The reviewers raised a number of issues about broader ecological impacts
and fisheries dynamics, although EPA appears to express substantial concern with linking such 
measures with economic valuation (Stratus Consulting 2004; EPA 2004e). With regard to nonuse 
values for the later regulatory phase, the panel appeared critical of the particular way in which 
EPA estimated nonuse values but supported EPA’s efforts to provide a nonuse value estimate.
OMB reviewed both the proposed and final rules and completed its actions by determining that 
the rule was “consistent with changes” (Regulatory Information 2002, 2004).
How did professional commentators respond publicly to the final rule? Unfortunately, this is 
basically unknowable because the public comment period applies only to the proposed rule. 
However, several professional economists criticized analytical elements of EPA’s proposed rule 8
and, later, data availability, on a variety of fronts.
3 Further, at least two of the economists, Frank 
Ackerman and Robert Stavins, disagreed with each other (Kysar, this volume), while the other 
economists presented a somewhat more common methodological view. At the risk of ignoring 
other economists not obvious in the record, I counted four economists whom I interpret as having
similar methodological interpretations and one with a different interpretation.
4 Some of the 
methods opposed by the larger group of economists were removed from the final analysis,
whereas movement of the monetized cost–benefit analysis toward the views of the economist 
with the minority interpretation appeared to be slight. Because no comment period existed for
the final rule, the extent of economic commenter’s agreement on the quality of the final rule is 
unknown.
Finally, was the completed analysis published in a formal externally peer-reviewed source? No. 
Could it potentially be published in such a source and thus by demonstration meet some level of 
professional standards? Possibly. Although this question has many facets—including the length 
of the CWIS analysis, which is more suited to a book than to a journal article, and the lack of a 
journal currently devoted to cost–benefit analysis—my sense is that a journal article devoted to 
the CWIS case could appear in an applied, peer-reviewed journal. In particular, the topic is at the 
frontier of integrating ecological and economic analysis, extensive information is provided in the 
analysis on technological alternatives, and a variety of quantitative analyses— including some 
relatively advanced econometric analyses of recreational choices—are provided. I conclude that 
a paper based on the CWIS rule could potentially appear in a peer-reviewed publication.
                                                
3 Commentators with economics Ph.D.s included Frank Ackerman, Thomas Grigalunas and James Opaluch 
(together), Robert Stavins, and Ivar Strand. Economists may have been elements of other teams providing comments.
4 It is true that science is not a democratic, majority process, and the author could add yet one more view on 
particular analytical aspects of the regulation. However, the challenge I trace here is the difficulty of determining an 
acceptable level of “quality” given the mandates placed on the agency.9
Although the evidence that the CWIS rule met the ambiguous “professional quality” standard is 
somewhat weaker, the fact that EPA carried out some peer reviews, that its analysis moved in the 
direction of the majority of professional commentators, and that it may be publishable in a peer-
reviewed journal, indicates that it probably meets guidelines provided by the Data Quality Act 
and the more ambiguous auditing standard of consistency with professional norms. The difficulty 
in determining the quality of a controversial analysis may also indicate the ambiguity of criteria 
and the potential usefulness of work in this area.
B. What an Economist Wants II: Decisionmaking Standards
Much of the controversy surrounding the CWIS rule appears to involve not only the analytical 
methods but the decisionmaking standards and the role played by OMB’s Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA; Heinzerling 2006). The choice of a decisionmaking standard by 
decisionmakers is outside of the role of economists, although a large body of public policy and 
economic literature, including cost–benefit analysis, suggests normative decision rules that could 
be followed in making a government decision. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act as 
amended in this case states that “[a]ny standard established…shall require…the best technology 
available for minimizing adverse environmental impact” (33 U.S.C. s. 316(b)). In addition,
agencies are directed by Presidential executive orders, primarily Executive Order (EO) 12866
(1993) (a) not to use the RIA to displace the agencies’ authority or responsibilities as authorized 
by law (EO 12866, s.9); (b) to assess both the costs and benefits of an intended regulation and
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the 
intended regulation justify its costs (EO 12866, s. 6); (c) to identify and assess alternative forms 10
of regulation that, to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives rather than a specific
behavior or manner of compliance (EO 12866, s. 8); and (d) to tailor regulations to impose the 
least burden on society, including various societal elements (EO 12866, s. 11).  
Consider first the decisionmaking standard under the law. Although a technology-based standard 
may appear simpler to define than an economics-based one, the apparent simplicity may belie
complex issues in “implementation and interpretation” (Freeman 1980). Importantly in this case, 
EPA chose never to explicitly define the AEI (EPA 2004a, 41612). Even with the simpler focus 
on impingement and entrainment used by the EPA, substantial uncertainty about environmental 
impact remained because of a paucity of what may seem like basic data, such as the natural 
mortality rate of a species (EPA 2004a, Regional Studies, A6–5). Consequently, it is unknown 
whether EPA chose the technology that would minimize that impact. Further, the cost of 
technologies was identified as a possible, though secondary, element of the decision (EPA 
2004a; Riverkeeper 2007).  
Several weaknesses result from the lack of definition of the AEI, uncertainty about 
environmental impacts, and secondary use of cost information. Regardless of the definition of
the AEI, it has multiple dimensions. EPA at least identified impacts, including the following: 
effects on various commercial, recreational, rare, sensitive, exotic, and disruptive species;
disruptions of ecological relationships and public satisfaction; organic carbon, nutrient, and 
energy transfer; and decreased local biodiversity (EPA 2004a, 41662). Determination of the AEI
would require a weighting of many factors. Analysts would be forced to come up with weights of 
relative importance, to defend equal weighting, or to explicitly acknowledge impacts that have 11
zero weight in quantitative or monetized analyses but that may be discussed in the text. 
Decisions would have to be made about which impacts are material to the decision. Economists 
would generally seek to use observed or inferred functions of prices as weights; alternatively,
other weighting approaches could be devised. In any event, the benefit of the regulation is 
essentially the reduction in the weighted AEI with a standard economic benefit analysis using 
monetized weights.  
Because any AEI developed based on the record would contain substantial uncertainty about 
impacts on the environment, it is extremely unlikely that one technology would be 
unambiguously best, an issue made even more complex by the multiple environments being 
considered, such as estuaries, freshwater lakes, and rivers. Thus, following the direction of the 
statute appears to allow for the potential for a benefit evaluation, measured by uncertain AEI 
reduction, and some evaluation of cost as a secondary element.  
OMB guidance (2003) further indicates that in situations of uncertainty, expected (mean) values 
should be used as the foundation for analysis; however, other treatments of uncertainty could be 
used, possibly including probabilistic AEI and cost analysis. Consequently, it is conceivable that 
EPA could have used an analysis that included elements of AEI reduction (benefits) and costs in 
a manner more consistent with the statute than developing a cost–benefit analysis that did not 
depend on a definition of AEI.
 In general, however, the determination of a decisionmaking standard that complies with the law 
is a legal question that is not answerable by economists. In hindsight, the actual analysis carried 12
out by EPA and the regulation failed the decisionmaking standard of both the law and EO 12866 
(Riverkeeper 2007) although that conclusion is under review by the Supreme Court at the time of 
this writing.
What of the additional requirements of EO 12866? Did EPA assess the costs and benefits and 
choose an approach in which the benefits justify the costs? Yes and no. EPA assessed costs and 
benefits in the final CWIS regulation; on the basis of that analysis, the monetized benefits did not 
justify the cost (EPA 2004a; EPA 2004b, D1–4). A break-even analysis was provided to 
illustrate how large the nonmonetized benefits must be for the rule to break even on a monetized 
net benefit basis. One possible inference is that statutory responsibilities trumped this element of 
the executive order because, on a monetized cost–benefit basis, the country would be better off 
without the rule in the standard interpretation. Alternatively, EPA may have determined that,
taken together, the monetized and nonmonetized benefits justified the costs, although they do not 
appear to explicitly make such a statement in the final regulation (EPA 2004a, 41663).
Did EPA specify a performance objective instead of the manner in which regulated entities must 
comply? Yes, to a large degree. An important aspect of the CWIS regulation was precisely the 
effort to identify a performance standard—the degree of mitigation provided by cooling 
towers—and to specify technological alternatives to meet that standard that also varied by
environmental conditions. The regulation specified a set of technologies that meet a range of 
impingement and entrainment performance reductions as well as some alternative means of 
compliance. Although this could be seen as an effort to acknowledge the uncertainty in both the 13
AEI and the performance of technology, the integration of uncertainty and performance could 
have been better clarified in the determination of the standard.  
Did EPA choose an approach that generated the least burden on society? Yes, to a large degree. 
This is the decisionmaking element closest to the discussion of the appropriateness of cost-
effectiveness in Riverkeeper (2007). EPA clearly chose an approach that imposed a significantly 
lighter burden on society than the cooling tower option that formed the performance basis for the 
regulation. EPA estimated that a cooling tower option would have an annualized post-tax 
compliance cost of $2,316 million (EPA 2004a, proposed EBA, B7–10, 2001$) and a total social 
cost of $3,507 million computed with a 7 percent real discount rate. This compares with an 
estimated annualized post-tax compliance cost of $250 million (EPA 2004a, final EBA, D1–3, 
2002$) and a social cost of $389 million for the final regulation.  
Although commenters debated many aspects of these estimates (EPA 2004e), it appears that EPA
did incorporate the economic burden on society in its determination. The record provides 
substantial evidence that the agency considered a lower-cost alternative to meeting a standard 
with the potential to save approximately $3 billion in annualized dollars or approximately $40 
billion in present value
5. To put this in a different context, the GAO would probably score an 
                                                
5 These are approximations without correcting for the one-year difference in the value of the dollar, differences in 
discount rates used by EPA for costs and benefits, and assuming a 7 percent real discount rate over an infinite time 
horizon. The difference between the infinite time horizon and a shorter one is V/r*(1-e
-rT) where V is the annual 
value, r is the discount rate and T is the terminal time. For instance, a 25-year time horizon at 7 percent would 
reduce the infinite time horizon value by 17 percent. If the alternative 3 percent discount rate were used, the cost 
savings would be approximately $100 billion.14
approximate $40 billion dollar nongovernmental cost saving if the EPA made the regulatory 
design change away from cooling towers in response to a recommendation by the GAO
6.
In summary, with regard to what decisionmaking standards were applied, the results are mixed 
but EPA’s failure to comply with statutory requirements appears to trump other aspects of the 
analysis at the time of this writing. Clearly, however, EPA did not apply a strict monetized 
cost–benefit decision rule although cost-effectiveness information was applied with the potential 
for materially reducing the burden on society.  
III.The Frontier of Linking Ecological and Economic Systems 
In what ways does this case study illustrate weaknesses in linking ecological impacts with a 
cost–benefit approach?   Consider that economists can be preoccupied with the monetary 
valuation stage and the normative, economics-based decision rules that constitute their area of 
comparative advantage. However, nothing can be monetarily valued without a change in quantity 
(or quality) in the environment broadly considered. Here lie the key difficulties in the case study. 
The environmental impacts of CWIS affect freshwater and saltwater ecosystems in a variety of 
ways, some of which are poorly understood. In short, the AEI was incompletely specified, a not 
unusual occurrence for ecological impacts. Even determining what is adverse requires some 
value judgment. For instance, increased recreational fishing or the congregation of an 
endangered species such as the manatee near thermal outlets may be viewed as adverse from one 
                                                
6 This did not occur; instead I provide this as an illustration of “scoring” cost savings such as used by the GAO 
(2008).15
perspective if it is a deviation from an environmental baseline. In fact, EPA did not define the 
objective function of its regulation, the AEI (EPA 2004a, 41612).  
From the standpoint of economically valuing impacts, the challenge is to find the material
ecological outputs or services that people value and to find ways to measure those impacts and 
values. For instance, impingement and entrainment do not easily translate into dimensions that 
people value. As a consequence, the links that connect the ecological and economic impacts are 
difficult to measure. Commercially and recreationally landed fish provide the most concrete 
linkage between the ecological and economic measurements in the RIA, but other linkages 
proved problematic. 
Governmental practitioners and consultants have been asked to resolve such basic research 
challenges. As indications of this frontier challenge, consider that the Committee on Valuing the 
Protection of Ecological Systems and Services (C-VPESS) of the EPA Science Advisory Board 
is drafting a report on the topic that may result in future guidance (EPA 2007, 2008). In addition, 
a National Research Council report has appeared since the regulation was finalized (Heal et al.
2005). Would the CWIS analysis have been substantially assisted by having these documents
available at an earlier date?    
First, both the C-VPESS draft report and Heal et al. (2005) discuss the difficulties in modeling 
ecological and economic systems and in linking the impacts. The Heal et al. report focuses 
primarily on economic approaches to valuation, embracing both use and nonuse values. The C-
VPESS draft report considers an expanded set of valuation methods useful at various stages of 16
the regulatory process but states that, in the case of RIAs, the economic component is to be 
“conducted in accordance with the methods and procedures of standard welfare economics” 
(EPA 2008, 122). The draft report included a survey of methods for social-based valuation 
approaches that are at the frontier of research; for instance, it posits that people may have 
different values as citizens than as consumers. However, at least some economists would 
probably be concerned about the decisionmaking context in which individuals are placed to elicit 
values for cost–benefit analysis (Spash 2007). For instance, a person placed in the experimental 
context of a citizen decisionmaker with a group of peers facing a relatively unknown problem 
may be influenced by the social context, the formation of the group, and the hypothetical nature 
of the setting, perhaps including issues related to the absence of actual budget limitations or the 
scope of choices being considered. List et al. (2004) recently found that a lack of social isolation 
may create a bias roughly equivalent to that created by the hypothetical nature of surveys that 
elicit economic values. These authors interpret social settings for value elicitation as inducing 
“respondents to include any number of utility-enhancing values that come from publicly 
advertising one’s own goodwill. But, since these ‘externality-type’ values are not germane to the 
good in question, rather to a class of goods, it is incorrect to lump them with any particular 
good’s value” (List et al. 2007, 749).
The C-VPESS citable draft report (the latest version is not citable per its webpage) has a special 
section on valuation for national rulemaking (EPA 2007, s. 6.1). Examples of draft guidance, 
which may change includes: 
 an early conceptual model of the ecological and economic system being analyzed (EPA 
2007, s. 6.1.2.1);17
 early identification of socially important impacts that may not be limited to economic 
methods;
 the early interaction of ecologists and economists to inform the prediction of biophysical 
changes in value-relevant terms (but the draft report notes, in the concentrated animal 
feeding operation example used, that “the combination of variation complexity, and gaps 
in information and understanding make it difficult for the Agency to assess the ecological 
impacts of its actions, particularly at the national scale;” EPA 2007, 122);
 the likely use of benefit transfer methods and quality checks in the development of 
monetized valuation measures; and 
Had this draft document become final, the advice may have served early on in the CWIS process 
to help frame and direct research. However, as is the case with general cost–benefit guidance
from OMB, it is unlikely to have been a substantial  help in resolving the difficulties in defining 
ecological impacts and linking those impacts to economic valuation measures.  
IV. Conclusion: What Does an Economist Want in a Regulatory Analysis?
I will assert the following.  Economists want decisionmakers to consider economic trade-offs 
involved in a decision based on credible information. We want a cost–benefit type of analysis to 
analyze our definition of efficiency while recognizing that cost–benefit analysis will not18
unambiguously identify a socially preferred policy (Arrow et al. 1996). If legal or other 
constraints exist, we typically want a cost-effectiveness analysis if the law is immutable or a 
cost–benefit analysis if we are considering changes in the law. We want price or functions of 
prices as societal measures of value from the interaction of many people in the marketplace. If 
markets are lacking, we want an experiment conducted that generates numbers as if a market
existed. We want sufficient precision to distinguish positive from negative net benefit values or 
to test a specific hypothesis or question. Economists want this information as they seek the 
largest economy, broadly considered, that is consistent with people’s preferences, technology, 
and environmental conditions. The largest economy, broadly considered, includes leisure time, 
the provision of environmental amenities, and nonmarket as well as market activity. If the 
distribution of goods and services that result from market forces in this largest economy is 
deemed inequitable, then economists currently look to the political process for distributional 
adjustments. Economists, and some other stakeholders, want an economic analysis to conform to 
norms of the discipline, which may be difficult to infer. Economists don’t want decisionmakers 
to be provided only with distributional information.  
Other stakeholders in the regulatory process may want a different type of analysis. For instance, 
a package of reports might be associated with an analysis. In the context of the CWIS rule, the 
ecological impacts are important to some stakeholders in their natural units; impacts in natural 
units also form a first step in an economic analysis. Some other type of noneconomic valuation—
such as energy or other modeling of the ecosystem—may gain credence. One can easily imagine 
however, a set of summary tables that proceeds from qualitative impacts, to quantitative impacts 
in their natural units, to valuations, and finally to a cost–benefit table. The regulatory 19
requirement for a cost–benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis, however, identifies an aspiration to 
report somewhere in the document a specific type of professionally recognized analysis.
  
What might EPA do to proceed, both in the specific CWIS case and for its economic regulatory 
evaluations in general? Regarding CWIS, ultimately, EPA created a complex regulation without 
a transparent message and analysis. An analysis of technologies that considers cost-effectiveness 
by defining a weighted AEI, taking explicit account of uncertainty and using cost as a secondary 
consideration, appears to be supported in the legal record and appears to contain many, if not all, 
of the elements that an economist would want. In particular, an explicit discussion of weighting 
an AEI may be one way of investigating alternative methods to capture society’s preferences.
From a broader regulatory evaluation perspective, creating new interdisciplinary science is a 
high hurdle for a decision support document like an RIA. EPA and other agencies, such as the 
National Science Foundation, might choose to foster additional frontier work so that models 
better linking ecosystems and the environment may be available commercially off the shelf the 
next time a regulation calls for such analysis. Both Heal et al. (2005) and the C-VPESS draft 
report (2008) contain recommendations for further research (those of the Heal et al. report are 
provided in Appendix A). To these research issues, I would add the following topics: an 
examination of instances in which it is better to use a number in place of a default of zero, an
investigation of faint behavioral trails for nonuse value, and research that more explicitly
recognizes uncertainty in the risk management decision that can lead to new valuation measures.  20
Regarding the use of default values of zero, cost–benefit analysts often are unable to find a 
number—whether related to quantity, value, or cost—that is exactly designed for the location or 
other context of the regulatory setting. Analysts often substitute estimates but, not infrequently, 
may choose to use a zero in the monetized cost–benefit computation because of imprecision or 
other reasons. In the context of the CWIS analysis, the final monetized cost–benefit analysis used 
zero values for fish that were not captured or that were not an input into commercial or 
recreational fishing, as well as for nonuse value. In another setting, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers chooses not to monetize the probability of a loss of life, although such impacts are 
typically discussed in the text of Corps documents (GAO 2005). In environmental applications, 
one aspect of this general issue has been discussed as benefits transfer (Freeman 2003), in which
means have been sought to improve the accuracy of benefits that are estimated in one location 
and “transferred” to an analysis for another location. This issue is central to many debates about 
omitted impacts in which the analyst chooses to use zero in the monetized estimate instead of an 
estimate transferred from a related study or estimated by other means. Research and improved 
guidance might exist to help analysts determine when zero is a better estimate than another value. 
For instance, one can test for a value different from zero both in a statistical sense—via standard 
statistical testing—and in a decision-analytical sense. One could investigate questions such as,
how far away from the true value does an estimate have to be before a value of zero is a better 
estimate? A preliminary result is that, given a mean squared error loss function, a value of zero is 
a worse estimator than any number less than two times the (unknown) true value (Farrow 2005).  
The valuation of people who may never use a resource, nonuse value, is also a difficult impact to
monetize. The authoritative panel that provided guidance on the use of survey-based (contingent)21
valuation methods also suggested a search for a faint behavioral trail of revealed behavior 
(Arrow et al. 1993). In my view, little work has been conducted relevant to this suggestion 
compared with the work to extend the methods of contingent valuation. For instance, researchers 
might pursue the thin trail that links observed news gathering behavior to follow-on activity,
such as charitable donations or changes in consumer purchases.  
Finally, and probably for ease of implementation, regulatory reviews focus on a basic approach 
requiring “benefits to justify costs.” However, the basic decision rules can change substantially 
in the presence of uncertainty, irreversibility, and an ability to obtain more information (Dixit 
and Pindyck 1994). In cases where a property right is under dispute and the goal is to maintain a
particular level of environmental services, it may be appropriate to spend significantly more than 
expected benefits (Farrow and Morel 2001). Analytically, such approaches suggest additional, 
difficult to measure, elements of the problem that are related to uncertainty. These elements are 
seldom considered, although they are mentioned in OMB guidance (2003).
Economists teach that wants are insatiable. What an economist wants to improve the regulatory 
process is probably insatiable as well, without consideration of the constraints on agency 
resources and the value of the economic information in the debate. Finding the analytical and 
communication level that is as simple as possible but no simpler—as was famously said by 
Einstein regarding natural science models—remains an art, not a science. Detail that is unlikely 
to change a decision should not be analyzed, but one should continue to ask, what policy 
alternative will improve the welfare of society? Economists have evolved their approach for 22
more than 150 years, and regulations like the CWIS rule continue this evolution. Important 
questions can be easy to ask and hard to answer.  23
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Appendix A
Research recommendations by Heal et al. (2005, 258), referred to as “overarching research 
needs,” are as follows:
Although much is known about the services provided by aquatic ecosystems and 
methods for valuing changes in these services exist, the committee believes that 
there are still major gaps in knowledge that limit our ability to incorporate 
adequately the value of ecosystem services into policy evaluations. Drawing from 
the preceding major conclusions and overarching recommendations provided 
above, the committee has identified the following research needs. The committee 
believes that funding to address these needs is necessary if progress toward 
improving the use of ecosystem valuation in policy decisions is to be made, and it 
recommends that such funding be a high priority.
 Improved documentation of the potential of various aquatic ecosystems to 
provide goods and services and the effect of changes in ecosystem 
structure and functions on this provision
 Increased understanding of the effect of changes in human actions on 
ecosystem structure and functions
 Increased interdisciplinary training and collaborative interaction among 
economists and ecologists
 Development of a more explicit and detailed mapping between ecosystem 
services as typically conceived by ecologists and the services that people 
value (and hence to which economic valuation approaches or methods can 
be applied)
 Development of case studies that show how these links can be established 
and templates that can be used more generally 
 Expansion of the range of ecosystem services that are valued using 
economic valuation techniques
 Improvements in study designs and validity tests for stated-preference 
methods, particularly when used to estimate nonuse values 
 Development of “cutting-edge” valuation methods, such as dynamic 
production function approaches and general equilibrium modeling of 
integrated ecological-economic systems27
 Improved understanding of the spatial and temporal thresholds for various 
ecosystems, and development of methods to assess and incorporate into 
valuation the uncertainties arising from the complex dynamic and 
nonlinear behavior of many ecosystems
 Improvements in the methods for assessing and incorporating uncertainty 
and irreversibility into valuation studies.28
Table 1.  Scorecard Evaluation of CWIS Cost–Benefit Analysis*
Item number Variables CWIS
Estimation of costs 
1  Stated costs exist  Yes
2  Quantified at least some costs  Yes
3  Monetized at least some costs  Yes
4  Monetized all or nearly all costs  Yes
5  Provided point estimate of total costs  Yes
6  Provided range for total costs  Yes
7  Associated costs w/ federal government Yes
8  Associated costs w/ nonfederal 
government 
Yes
9  Associated costs with producers  Yes
10  Provided best estimate and range 
for total costs 
Yes
Estimation of benefits 
11  Stated benefits exist  Yes
12  Quantified at least some benefits  Yes
13  Monetized at least some benefits  Yes
14  Monetized all or nearly all benefits  No
15  Provided point estimate of total benefits  Yes
16  Provided range for total benefits  No
17 Provided best estimate or range for total 
benefits 
Yes
18 Provided best estimate and range for
 total benefits 
No
Comparison of costs and benefits 
19 Calculated net benefits  Yes
20 Provided a point estimate of net benefits  Yes
21 Provided a range for net benefits  No
22 Calculated cost-effectiveness  Somewhat
23 Provided a point estimate of cost-
effectiveness 
Yes
24 Provided a range for cost-effectiveness  No
25 Had positive net benefits  No
26 Calculated net benefits or cost-
effectiveness 
Yes
27 Calculated net benefits and cost-
effectiveness 
Somewhat
28 Calculated both point estimate and range 
for net benefits 
No
29 Calculated either point estimate or range 
for net benefits 
Yes
Evaluation of alternatives 
30 Gave at least one alt. standard/level  Yes
31 Gave at least one alt. method  Yes
32 Quantified alternatives (costs)  Yes
33 Monetized alternatives (costs)  Yes29
Item number Variables CWIS
34 Quantified alternatives (benefits)  Somewhat
35 Monetized alternatives (benefits)  No
36 Calculated cost-effectiveness of 
alternatives 
Somewhat
37 Calculated net benefits of alternatives  No
38 Calculated net benefits or cost-
effectiveness of alternatives 
Somewhat
39 Considered some alternatives Yes
40 Clarity of presentation Average/Poor
Consistent use of 
analytical assumptions 
41  Identified dollar year  Yes
42  Used consistent dollar year  Yes
43  Identified discount rate  Yes
44  Used consistent discount rate  Yes
45  Discount rate = 7 percent  Yes
46  Used consistent costs and benefits  Yes
47  Identified and consistently used discount 
rate and dollar year 
Yes
Notes: Evidence may be in supporting documents and not in summary documents.
*Source: Scorecard format based on Hahn and Dudley (2007), some item numbers have been omitted because of 
their original focus on health and safety.  CWIS evaluations are by the author.